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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GIBBONS & REED CO~IP ANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
-vs.-
S. Y. GUTHRIE, ADAM K. GRAFE 
and ROBERT I. LUDWIG, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 7850 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants and defendants appeal from a judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
awarding Gibbons & Reed Company, a Utah corporation, 
plaintiff and respondent, damages of $12,356.75, plus 
interest at 6% from March 18, 1951. 
The action in the lower court was founded on con-
tract as set forth in the complaint. (R. 1) *. Complaint 
alleged $15,356.75 damages (R. 1, 2) and the evidence 
proved damages of $15,383.82 (R. 285) less $50.00 (R. 
*Note : "R" refers to red numbers at bottom of transcript. 
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140) for a total of $15,333.82. The damages consisted of 
expenses and costs (R. 84 & 85) incurred by the respond-
ent in moving equipment in and out to the job in Garfield 
County from Salt Lake City and in furnishing supplies 
and materials and labor to perform said contract for the 
convenience of appellants (R. 69-71) for the period as set 
forth in the complaint. (R. 1). See exhibit B for items 
of expenses and costs. (R. 75, 76, 106-113, 128-145). 
Respondent had the burden of proving the allega-
tions of its complaint, all material allegations of which 
were admitted by appellants in its second defense with 
the exception of respondent's damages. (R. 5-6). 
Appellants had the burden of proving the allegations 
of their affirmative defense. (R. 6-14). 
The primary issues in the lower court were : 
a. Whether plaintiff (respondent) proved dam-
ages as set forth in the complaint. 
b. The terms of the parol agreement between the 
parties. 
c. Whether defendants (appellants) sustained 
the burden of their affirmative defense, and if 
so, was the affirmative defense sufficient to 
deny the plaintiff (respondent) recovery un-
der the allegations, admissions and evidence 
supporting the proof of the complaint. 
The facts as presented by appellants in their brief 
are not complete and accordingly respondent submits 
the following more complete statement of facts. 
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FACTS 
The respondent, Gibbons & Reed Company is a Utah 
corporation with 40 years experience in Utah as a heavy 
engineering, highway and building contractor. (R. 44, 451 
47, 48 & 180). The appellant S. Y. Guthrie is a resident 
of Dallas, Texas, (R. 43) with experience as a mechani~al 
processing, piping, heating and refrigeration contractor 
(R. 272, 273) and knew the Gibbons & Reed Company 
to be a reliable general construction firm. (R. 273). The 
appellant Adam K. Grafe is also a resident of Dallas, 
Texas, also having had prior satisfactory experience with 
respondent (R. 180) and having had many years experi-
ence in the mining business. ( R. 146). 
Grafe, Guthrie and one other person, Thomas J. 
Bate, the latter person over whom respondent was un-
successful in securing service of summons (R. 39, 40) 
were partners engaged in mining uranium in the Henry 
:Mountain ~lining District of Garfield County, Utah. (R. 
39-42). This action arose over said mining venture. 
The appellants entered into an agreement with re-
spondent, which in the words of appellant Guthrie was an 
oral agreement (R. 43) and was neither a cost-plus, lump 
sum or a unit price contract (R. 44), but was an oral con-
tract consisting of a proposal (Exhibit A), which was 
an estimate of ultimate costs according to appellants 
(Plaintiff's interrogatories, No. 4 (R. 20) and defend-
ants' answer No. 4 in Exhibit 13). The terms of said 
agreement included certain preliminary road building 
and camp building construction in addition to an approx-
imate schedule for drilling, drifting into ore bodies, 
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stripping and moving ore, (R. 196, 197 and 183, line 6, 
289, 292). The ultimate objective was to enable appel-
lants by April 15 to determine if there was sufficient 
ore in said claims to warrant appellants taking up an 
option with a Mr. L. R. Weeks for the lease and opera-
tion of said claims, (R. 153). Said proposal (Exhibit 
A) also listed the costs of operation for the work to be 
undertaken and an option allowing appellants to termin-
ate at any time. Appellants agreed to this proposal 
(R. 158) without subsequent disapproval, (R. 183). Not-
withstanding the absence of any reference to the pro-
duction of any ore, appellants now contend that respond-
ents are required to have produced enough ore to partly 
pay for the costs of the job. Even if this contention were 
so, respondents did produce a substantial amount of ore 
to partly defray the said expenses. (R. 214) (Exhibit 
11). 
Respondent was only interested in performing thiioi 
exploratory mining work for appellants in order to put 
respondent in a more favored position to secure a con-
tract for the construction of a large ore processing mill 
at Green River, Utah, which was being considered by ap-
pellant. (R. 52, 53, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 77, 78). As a matter 
of fact, the only motivating factor to promote respondent 
to such a generous offer was the prospect for additional 
work, from appellants. (R. 77 and 78). 
Under the terms of said oral agreement, respond-
ent, Gibbons & Reed Company, furnished the equipment 
for the operation, at the rental rates set forth in respond-
ent's proposal (Exhibit A) (R. 57 and 58); said rental 
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rates were reasonable and below the recognized rates 
of the Associated Equipment Distributors, (R. 118). 
Respondent paid for the necessary supplies, materials 
and parts that went into said operation including the 
foodstuffs and assmned the payroll for all workmen 
hired by Harold Ecker. (R. 55 and 56). Appellant Grafe 
inforn1ed George Jones, agent for respondent, that 
Harold Ecker, long time resident of Wayne County, was 
the only really qualified person to conduct the mining 
operation in this Henry niountain Uranium venture, (R. 
50, 82, 83 and 8±) and for this reason said Ecker was to 
supervise the job, hire the employees (R. 61 and 62) 
and all employees were carried on the payroll of respond-
ents. :Jir. Ludwig, agent of appellants instructed re-
spondents also to place ~Ir. Robert Deming, a geologist, 
upon the payroll (R. 91 and 92). All personnel remained 
with appellants after the Gibbons & Reed contract termin-
ated and its equipment removed (R. 187). 
Gibbons & Reed commenced work at the request of 
the appellants (R. 156) on February 9, 1951. (Exhibit 
I). However, equipment did not move on to the job until 
February 19, 1951, because Gibbons & Reed was threaten-
ed with a trespass action (R. 59, 60, 233 and 234) by the 
Lessor of the property, L. R. Weeks. Thereafter the 
heavy equipment was sent to the job after having been 
inspected at respondent's shop at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
(R. 86, 103 and 104) arriving at the job on February 
25, 1951. (Exhibit F). 
Thereafter in accordance with said agreement the 
respondent, Gibbons & Reed Co. constructed, roads, 
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buildings, drilled test holes, ripped and stripped over-
burden and drifted into ore bodies, furnishing the 
machinery, labor and supplies therefor. That notwith-
standing adverse weather and physical conditions, the 
respondent performed pursuant to said contract, reason-
ably, substantially and sufficiently to enable appellants 
to undertake the option with L. R. Weeks, even though 
appellants terminated the contract at the halfway point. 
Those persons on the job from day to day all recog-
nized that the construction of roads, buildings, stripping, 
drilling and production of ore was accomplished from 
February 9, 1951 until March 12, 1951. 
Robert Deming geologist who made reports on the 
progress of the job stated that the work was satisfactory 
(Dem. dep. 62) and that respondent's equipment was 
appropriate, (Dem. dep. 74). 
Harold Ecker, appellants' witness stated that pre-
liminary work was accomplished including stripping, 
drilling and building cabins, even before the heavy D-8 
cat* of Gibbons & Reed arrived on the job. (R. 242 and 
243). 
Verl Boyer, the cat operator, stated that the opera~ 
tions were normal for such construction work. (R. 98). 
Appellant Grafe himself stated that certain prelimi~ 
nary work was necessary and that Gibbons and Reed had 
performed same. (R. 196 and 197) and (R. 183, line 6). 
By appellants' Exhibit 11 some 15.5 tons of ore were 
shipped from the job on March 19 to March 31 and that 
*Note: Largest Caterpillar tractor manufactured with dozer 
blade on front end and control unit behind. 
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some 37.S tons were shipped fron1 :March 31 to Aprill-l. 
Contradictory to this, however, appellant Grafe stated 
that all ore was 1nerely stockpiled on job from F'ebruary 
15 until April15, (R. 21-l) and admittedly 15 tons at least 
was frmn efforts of Gibbons and Reed. (R. 214). How-
ever, since no ore was produced by appellants before 
April 18 (Dem. dep. 60 and 72) all of this ore shipped, 
totaling son1e 60 tons, could only have been produced by 
Gibbons & Reed prior to the tern1ination of said contract 
on March 12. 
As conclusive evidence of the completeness of the 
work of Gibbons & Reed is the fact that the appellants 
exercised their option on April 15, (R. 192), having 
done little, if any, work since Gibbons and Reed were 
ordered fron1 the job. As stated by appellant Grafe (R. 
153): 
"I told them that was the essence of our want-
ing any work done down on the leases at all, was 
to give us the required information to see whether 
we would, within the deadline of our option (April 
15, 1951) exercise such option and take over the 
leases." 
During the performance of the work by Gibbons and 
Reed, daily and current reports of the labor, supplies and 
material costs were sent to Gibbons and Reed, (Dem. dep. 
66-69) (R. 246) and said costs were paid by Gibbons and 
Reed, (R. 107-112, 131, 142-144), and currently entered in 
the books. (Exhibits B and C). 
Notwithstanding reasonable and substantial perform-
ance of the work, appellants Grafe and Guthrie visited 
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the job on March 12, 1951, found the D-8 cat and the 
large compressor temporarily not working and summarily 
terminated the contract. Appellants erroneously con-
cluded that said equipment was beyond repair. The D-8 
cat had only four small bolts broken, which could have 
been repaired in two to four hours (R. 97 and 286), 
and the cmnpressor could have been repaired in fifteen 
minutes by letting air out of the line (R. 286). Boyer, 
the D-8 cat operator, a competent heavy equipment 
mechanic, told appellants the cause of the breakdown 
and requested that parts be sent for (R. 98 and 102). 
Harold Ecker, Adam Grafe, and S. Y. Guthrie were not 
mechanics, and admittedly unqualified to judge the 
mechanical condition of equipment. As stated by Boyer, 
the usual number of parts and tools were available on 
the job, it not being usual to have on hand on such a job 
every required small part, particularly the said small 
bolts that caused the breakdown. (R. 101). Many parts 
and tools were supplied. (Dem. dep. 37). 
Had the appellants been interested in continuing the 
job with Gibbons and Reed, they could have phoned from 
the C.A.A. field for the missing parts or could have 
instructed Boyer on his trip to Salt Lake City to procure 
the parts. Appellants declined to follow this approach. 
(R. 276 and 210). 
Thereafter on the 14th day of March, 1951, Gibbons 
and Reed was notified that their entire operation would 
be discontinued as of March 18, (R. 64), and the appel-
lants would get their own equipment to use down on the 
job. (R. 65). Appellants then acquired a D-6 cat from 
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Bates, one of the partners which arrived on the job April 
8 and a traxcavator which arrived on the job April 18, 
both pieces of equipment being new and both pieces of 
equip1nent broke down several times delaying the job. (R. 
203, :20±), (De1n. dep. 63, 6±). Appellants continued 
Ecker and all of the employees on their payroll. Appel-
lant's expended less n1an hours from ~larch 19 until April 
1-! than Gibbons & Reed expended from February 8 to 
March 12, the date of termination. As stated by Deming, 
(Dem dep. 60 and 72) appellants did not get into full 
swing until April 18, 1951, and that no ore was produced 
by appellants until July, 1951. Because of the great 
delay from 1\'Iarch 12 to April 8, most employees thought 
the job was folding up. (Dem. dep. 60). However, the 
appellants exercised their option with L. R. Weeks on 
April15, 1951, which proved the performance by Gibbons 
& Reed was satisfactory. 
The facts may be accurately summarized as follows: 
Gibbons & Reed pursuant to an agreed schedule of 
costs undertook at the request of appellants certain 
preliminary and exploratory work for appellants to en-
able appellants to determine the feasibility of taking up 
an option with L. R. Weeks on the subject mining claims. 
Notwithstanding inclement weather, a threat of trespass 
action, the necessity of building roads and buildings, 
respondent Gibbons & Reed Company had within one-
half the alloted 60 day option time drilled, stripped and 
drifted sufficiently to allow appellants with very little, 
if any, additional work to exercise their option, thereby 
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accomplishing the object for which the work was under-
taken. 
Appellants benefited by respondent's work without 
one cent reimbursement to Gibbons & Reed for costs 
expended. Appellants terminated said contract at a 
point when Gibbons & Reed had substantially accom-
plished its purpose. Appellants then attempting to relieve 
themselves of their obligation to pay claimed, unjustifi-
ably that Gibbons & Reed's equipment was no good and 
that respondent had failed to perform satisfactorily. 
As a matter of fact, appellants' new equipment which 
also broke down was not on the job long enough to do 
any good before April 15. Appellants exercised their 
option upon the basis of work accomplished by Gibbons 
& Reed. 
With the foregoing factual background respondent 
now answers each point cited as error by appellants. 
However, it is noted that appellant does not challenge 
the conclusions of law of the trial court, but objects only 
to the facts as found by the trial court. It is axiomatic 
in appellate practice that the province of the appellate 
court is not to try the facts, but rather is to test the 
issues of law. The general rule being stated thusly in 
5 C.J.S. 550: 
"* * * questions of fact in actions at law are 
to be tried and determined in the court of original 
jurisdiction and not in an appellate court exercis-
ing strictly the functions of a court of review, 
which is in general limited to the correction of 
errors of law. The probative force of evidence is 
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for the consideration of the triers of the facts in 
the court below, and the appellate court ordinarily 
cannot consider the weight of the evidence. Simi-
lar expressions of the general principle stated are 
that questions of fact determined below will not 
be disturbed on appeal where the evidence is con-
flicting, where there was evidence sufficient to go 
to the jury, where the evidence supports the action 
of the court below in either one of two ways, and 
where no injustice appears, and the rule applies 
notwithstanding a finding of fact is apparently 
against the weight or preponderance of the evi-
dence, that different minds might arrive at oppo-
site conclusion on a consideration of the evidence 
or that a mere difference of opinion between the 
reviewing court and trial judge or the jury on the 
weight of the evidence exists ; * * * Where there 
is any admissable or competent substantial evi-
dence on the whole record or reasonable inference 
therefrom to support the fact determined in the 
lower court, the fact so determined will not be dis-
turbed on appeal." 
In Walker Bros. v. Int. Milling Co., 65 Utah 340, the 
Court stated: 
"This is a proceeding at law, and therefore 
we can examine into the evidence only for the pur-
pose of determining whether there is some sub-
stantial competent evidence in support of every 
material and controlling finding." 
Other Utah cases : 
Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394; 
Robinson v. Thomas, 7.5 Utah 446; 
In re Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312; 
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Knight v. Wessler, 67 Utah 354; 
Sierra Nevada Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., 
48 Utah 12. 
Respondent contends that for the most part appel-
lant's appeal seeks to retry the facts heretofore deter-
mined by the lower court and that upon the showing 
of some substantial evidence supporting each of the Find-
ings of Fact objected to by appellant, that appellant's 
appeal should be denied. 
APPELLANTS POINT NO. I 
THE SUF'FICIENCY OF CONCLUSION OF LAW 
NO. 2, to-wit: 
THE DEFENDANTS IN BREACH OF SAID AGREE-
MENT HAVE NEVER PAID PLAINTIFF FOR THE EX-
PENSES INCURRED UNDER THE TERMS OF SAID AGREE-
MENT AND THAT BY REASON THEREOF, PLAINTIFF HAS 
BEEN DAMAGED IN THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND 
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-
FIVE CENTS ($12,356.75') PLUS INTEREST AT SIX PER-
CENT (6%) FROM THE TERMINATION DATE OF SAID 
CONTRACT (MARCH 18th, 1951). 
Appellants predicate their case on appeal upon a 
lack of performance by respondent constituting such a 
complete breach of contract that respondent should not 
even recover their costs incurred. An examination of the 
evidence in the record shows conclusively that respond-
ent performed in complete accordance with the agree-
ment, up to the point when appellant abruptly and with-
out reasonable cause terminated respondent's activities 
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when only one half of the 60 day option period had 
elapsed. The evidence further shows that the appellants 
exercised their option with L. R. Weeks within the 60 
day period prior to April15, 1952, notwithstanding that 
from ~Iarch 1~ until April 15, appellants accomplished 
little if any work. The exercise of said option was the 
very purpose of the exploratory work undertaken by 
Gibbons & Reed for appellants. 
The evidence shows that Gibbons & Reed proposed 
to do the exploratory and preliminary work for appel-
lants, the cost basis for which was set forth in a proposal, 
(Exhibit A). Said proposal included an estimated sched-
ule for drilling, stripping and drifting into ore bodies, 
all of which was to be accomplished subsequent to re-
moval of overburden, construction of roads, camp facili-
ties, etc. This work was to determine if further produc-
tion of ore would be feasible and also to determine if 
appellants should exercise their option with L. R. Weeks. 
Said work included by reason of necessity, the construc-
tion of roads and buildings on said claims. (R. 196, 
197 and 183, line 6). (R. 289, 292). The workmen were 
hired by Harold Ecker who was recommended for em-
ployment by appellants. All workmen were paid by 
Gibbons & Reed as a convenience to appellants and as 
part of the cost of operating said project. (Dem. dep. 
36) (R. 50, 56). 
Work commenced on the project prior to the arrival 
of Gibbons & Reed's heavy equipment. (R. 242, 243). 
Gibbons & Reed's heavy equipment arrived on the job 
February 19. A threatened trespass action by L. R. 
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Weeks prevented earlier delivery of said heavy equip-
ment. (R. 59, 60, 233 and 234). The work of building 
roads, camp buildings, drilling, drifting and stripping 
was carried forward until terminated March 12, 1951. 
( R. 242, 243, 98, 196, 197, 183 line 6, 292). 
Admittedly some 15.5 tons of ore were produced by 
Gibbons and Reed, (R. 214) and some additional37.8 tons 
were shipped off the job which could only have been pro-
duced by Gibbons and Reed, (see Exhibit 11 of appel-
lants) (Dem. dep. 60, 72). 
On April 15, 1951, appellants by reason of the work 
of Gibbons & Reed, exercised their option with L. R. 
Weeks, thereby fulfilling the object of their agreement 
with respondent. (R. 192, 153). 
Appellants thus received the benefit of Gibbons & 
Reed's performance without damage. Appellants did 
not introduce evidence of damage sustained. 
Appellants claim that Gibbons & Reed did not drill 
as many holes per day, as allegedly required in its pro-
posal, Exhibit A. As a matter of fact, the proposal states 
that the number of holes and amount of drilling was 
only an estimate presumably to be accomplished sub-
sequent to completion of the preliminary work. But 
certainly as admitted by appellant Guthrie, this was not 
a unit price or lump sum contract for the drilling of a 
certain number of holes, (R. 43) payment to be made 
per hole drilled. Yet appellant uses this false criteria 
as a means of alleging failure of respondent to perform. 
Respondent went down on the job in the middle of 
winter, built camp buildings, and roads necessary for the 
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job and then con1menced the nwving of the ore and com-
menced the drilling, deriYing frmn its efforts considerabl~ 
ore and of such quality that appellants felt safe in tak-
ing up its option to further produce said ore. 
Respondent undeniably performed according to the 
terms of the agreen1ent, in a reasonable and bona fide 
manner, and by such performance did not breach its 
contract as alleged by appellants. The lower court so 
folmd and should only be reversed for a gross misappli-
cation of these facts to the law. 
Respondent seeks recovery only for those expenses 
and costs actually and reasonably incurred in the per-
formance of the contract, all of which resulted in a benefit 
to appellants. No profits are claimed. 
The contract is clearly one terminable at the will 
of appellants. However, even a contract terminable at will 
must be determined with reasonable cause. The law ap-
pears quite uniform in allowing recovery in a case such 
as this where one party may and does terminate the con-
tract after the other party has partly performed. The 
element of recovery allowed is the expenditures in the 
preparation and in the performance of the contract or a 
part thereof. Respondent in seeking recovery accordin~ 
to the terms o{ the agreement is in effect merely seeking 
recovery for the amount under the contract, said contract 
being merely a cost basis upon which the actual costs 
were determined and incurred. Respondent worked 
a certain period at the rates listed in the agreement and 
when the contract was terminated, the costs at these rates 
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had accrued to a certain amount, which is the sum sought 
in this recovery. 
The fundamental principle applicable to services 
rendered or the supplying of goods is stated in Vincent 
v. Palmer, 19 A. 2d 183 (Md.): 
"It is true that a hiring at will can be termi-
nated at the pleasure of either party. But after an 
employee has rendered services under an express 
or implied contract, he is entitled to recover for 
the services he has rendered." 
And as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts 
No. 404: 
"Where under the contract a party may termi-
nate it at his option he is not liable after termina-
tion for further transactions thereunder, but obli-
gations which have already accrued are not affect-
ed." 
Further authorities upholding respondent's position 
are cited as follows: 
Mile v. California Growers Wineries, 114 P. 2d 651, 
(California) : 
"When a contract for continuing services is 
terminated after they have been rendered pur-
suant thereto, the employer is nevertheless liable 
for the services already performed* * *" 
"A contract for services or commodities can-
not be terminated so as to avoid liability for serv-
ices or commodities already furnished." 
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U.S. v. Frank A. Beharn, 110 U. S. 329 28 Law Ed. 
168: 
"The party who voluntarily and wrongfully 
puts an end to a contract and prevents the other 
party from performing it, is estopped from deny-
ing that the injured party has not been damaged 
to the extent of his actual loss and outlay fairly 
incurred." 
Please refer also to Katz v. Bedford, 19 Pac. 523, 1 
L.R.A. 826 (California) wherein it was held that even 
where the contractor wilfully failed to perform he could 
recover for his expenditures upon a basis of quantum 
meruit since the contract was a divisible one. This case 
merely shows to what extent the courts will go in allow-
ing recovery for work and expenditures already incurred. 
Respondent did not wilfully fail to perform, and the evi-
dence so shows. 
It is clear therefore that upon a termination of the 
contract under an option to terminate, the promisee must 
reimburse the other party for his expenditures incurred 
in performing to the extent performance was permitted 
before termination. Such is the theory of this case. 
However, disregard for the moment the option to 
terminate and assume that respondent had breached the 
contract by not performing as fully as it should. The 
cases clearly hold that even though the party performing 
the construction or supplying the materials has not 
complied with the contract in full, but has substantially 
performed the contract he should be reimbursed for his 
contract price, less damages to the other party. Of 
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course these cases for the most part envisage an entire 
contract, not one terminable at will. But the principle is 
nonetheless applicable to the instant case on appeal. 
The measure of damage to appellants under all avail-
able law would only be the amount of loss sustained by 
appellants, but in this case there is not one scintilla of 
evidence indicating a loss of any kind sustained by the 
appellant. Had respondent breached this agreement, 
appellant could have then completed the contract either 
by using their own forces or by entering into another 
contract with a new contractor and could have billed 
the respondent for the amount expended over and above-
the original contract price. This later alternative, cus-
tomary in the construction industry and under contract 
law, admittedly was not done by the appellants. 
Under any theory advanced by the appellants and 
even assuming the respondent breached its part of the 
agreement, the respondent is still entitled to recover the 
amount expended both in preparation for the contract 
and the amount expended in the actual performance of 
same, less the damage to the appellants. Since appellants 
omit all evidence and proof of damage, it would appear 
that the trial court properly ruled that the respondent 
was at leas't entitled to its costs and expenditures in con-
ducting and promoting the work for the appellants. 
The facts clearly indicate, however, a complete and 
substantial performance by respondent until the contract 
was 'terminated by appellants. 
In Woodward v. Fuller, 80 N. Y. 312, the New York 
Court of Appeals, after pointing out that under the old 
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rule ordinarily a contractor who has not fully performed 
his contra:ct cannot recover the compensation provided 
for in the contract, states at pages 315 and 316: 
"'That there has been a relaxation of the rule, 
and now on such a contract there may be a re-
royery without a literal or exact performance of it. 
It is now the rule, that where a builder has in good 
faith intended to comply with the contract, and ha·s 
substantially complied with it, although there may 
be slight defects caused by inadvertence or unin-
tentional omissions, he may recover the contract 
price, less the damage on account of such defects. 
The defects must not run through the whole nor 
be so essential as that the object of the parties, to 
have a specified amount of work done in a par-
ticular way, is not accomplished. (Phillips v. Gal-
lant, 62 N.Y. 264)." 
What constitutes substantial performance has been 
a fruitful source of litigation. Substantial performance 
is performance except as to unsubstantial omissions with 
compensation therefor. Where the omission is slight and 
unintentional, in order to prevent the hardship of a fail-
ure to recover even for that which was well done, compen-
sation is substituted pro tanto for performance. The rule 
is that where a builder has in good faith intended to com-
ply with the contract, and has substantially complied with 
it, although there may be slight defects caused by inad-
vertence or unintentional omissions, he may recover the 
contract price, less the damages on account of such de-
fects. Spence v. Ham, 57 N.E. 412, 51 L.R.A. 238. Crouch 
et al v. Gutmann, 134 N.Y. 45, 31 N.E. 271. Slight and in-
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significant imperfections or deviations may be "over-
looked, on the principle of de minimis." Van Clief v. Van 
V echtem, 29 N.E. 1017 and 1019. 
While it is difficult to state what the term substan-
tial performance or substantial compliance as applied 
to building construction contracts means, it seems that 
there is substantial performance of such a contract where 
all the essentials necessary to the full accomplishment of 
the purpose for which the thing contracted for has been 
constructed or performed with such an approximation 
to complete performance that the owner obtains substan-
tially what is called for by the contract. Imperfection in 
matters of detail which do not constitute a deviation from 
the general plan contemplated for the work and do not 
enter into the substance of the contract do not prevent 
the performance from being regarded as substantial per-
formance. See Section 42, American Jurisprudence, page 
31, volume 9. 
In determining whether or not the contract has been 
substantially performed controlling importance has in 
some decisions been given to the cost of remedying the 
omissions, defects, and deviations as compared to the con-
tract price of the whole work. See Annotation L.R.A. 348, 
and 349. 
The true measure of recovery is the sum stipulated 
in the agreement less the damages sustained by the fail-
ure strictly to perform. Woodruff v. Hough, 91 U.S. 596, 
23 N.E. 322; Hammaker v. Schleigh, 147 Atlantic 790, 65 
A.L.R. 1285; Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 23 
A.L.R. 1429; Pelletier v. Masse, 143 Atlantic 609, 38 
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A.L.R. 1377. Dan1ages recoverable by the owner for delay 
in perforn1ance of a building contract are ordinarily the 
amount of earnings or rentals lost. Hammaker v. 
Schleigh, 1±7 Atlantic 790, 65 A.L.R. 1285. Where the de-
fects are remedial without taking down and reconstruct-
ing any substantial portion of the building, the amount of 
deduction from the contract price to which the owner is 
entitled is the expense of making the work conform to con-
tract requirements, Walsh Construction Co. v. Clevelwnd, 
271 Fed. 701; Havorty Co. v. Jones, 197 P. 105; State v. 
Riddle, 184 P. ±43; Gove v. Island City Mercantile & Mill 
Co., 17 P. 740; Edmond v. Wellings, 110 P. 533. See 65 
A.L.R.1285, Hammaker v. Schleigh: 
"The measure of recovery in case of substan-
tial but not exact performance of a building con-
tract where there has been no wilful breach going 
to the essence of the contract, but there have been 
comparatively slight omissions and defects in per-
formance which can be readily ascertained, meas-
ured, and compensated in damages is the contract 
price less whatever sum 'Shall be required to com-
plete the work." 
A building contractor who in good faith has per-
formed all that the contract requires although not at the 
time or in the manner required is entitled to compensa-
tion for the fruits of his material and labor received by 
the owner, Hammaker v. Schleigh, 147 Atlantic 790. At 
page 34 of volume 9, American Jurisdiction, it is quoted: 
"In accordance with the general rule a party 
to a building and construction contract who has 
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performed part of it according to its terms, but is 
prevented by the other party from performing or 
completing the contract, may recover compensa-
tion for the work performed and the materials fur-
nished, Chicago v. Tilley, 103 U. S. 146; Valente v. 
Wineberg, 67 Atlantic 369; Weis v. Devlin, 3 S.W. 
726." 
Forfeiture clauses in building and construction con-
tracts are usually strictly construed against the owner 
and usually a mere delay in the progress of the work will 
not justify a forfeiture, Brady v. Oliver, 147 S.W. 1135. 
The contractor does not, under all forms of contract, for-
feit his right to recover the contract price for construc-
tion of the building by the fact that the owner takes pos-
session and completes it under the terms of the contract 
because of the contractors delay, Page 35 American 
Jurisprudence, volume 9. 'See also page 37 A. J., volume 
9, quoted as follows: 
"It appears to be a well settled rule that if a 
contractor agrees to do certain work within a spe-
cified time, and he is prevented from performing 
the contract by the act or default of the other party 
or by the acts of persons for whose conduct the 
latter is responsible, the delay thus occasioned is 
excused and the contractor may not be held liable 
under the provisions for liquidated damages or 
otherwise for his non-compliance with the terms 
of the contract." 
The American courts are united in holding that a 
substantial performance of a building contract will sup-
port a recovery either on the contract or a quantum mer-
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uit basis, Omaha v. Hammond, 94 U.S. 98; Woodruff v. 
Hough, 91 U.S. 596, and numerous other citations found 
on page 30 of volmne 9, paragraph 40, A.J.P. At page 30 
of volume 9, American Jurisdiction, there are apparently 
three reasons given for the rule that a substantial per-
formance of a building contract will support recovery. 
The first is that the work on a building is such that even if 
rejected, the owner of the land receives the benefit of the 
contractor's labor and materials which is not the case 
where a chattel is constructed as the chattel may be re · 
turned. Since the owner receives the fruits of the build-
er's labor, it is deemed equitable to require the former 
to pay for what he gets. Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, 129 
N.E. 889, 23 A.L.R. 1429; Leonard v. People's Tobacco 
Warehouse Co., 122 S.E. 678. See Annotation 24 L.R.A. 
327 and 328. The second reason is that it is next to im-
possible for a builder to comply literally with all the 
minute specifications in a building contract, Glacius 'V. 
Black, 50 N.Y. 145. The third reason is that the parties 
are presumed to have impliedly agreed to do what is 
reasonable under all circumstances with reference to the 
subject of performance, Spence v. Ham, 57 N.E. 412, 51 
L.R.A. 238. 
It has been generally, though not invariably, held that 
the rule which permits recovery in case of substantial per-
formance applies even though the contract requires the 
work to be performed to the satisfaction of the owner~ 
his architect, or other representative, since his judgment 
in the matter is to be exercised reasonably and not arbi-
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trarily. Erickson v. Ward, 107 N.E. 593. Then quoting 
A.J. at page 31, volume 9 as follows: 
"Since the rule permitting a recovery in case 
of substantial performance of a building contract 
is based on equitable considerations, it is usually 
stated as essential to its application that the con-
tractor must have acted in good faith and have un-
intentionally failed." 
Gibbons & Reed, respondent, clearly acted in good 
faith and substantially performed the terms of the agree-
ment. The foregoing cases are cited for the general 
principle of recovery for partial performance of the 
terms of a contract. 
Appellant assumes a breach by respondent, when as 
a matter of fact the lower court found that there was 
no such breach. Aside from the general comment that 
appellants authorities are inapplicable because based 
upon a breach, which alleged breach is entirely lacking 
in the present case, respondent makes the following obser-
vations about the authorities cited by appellants: 
On page 9 of appellant's brief, appellants contend 
that respondent falls under a quoted section of C.J.S., 
page 946. Respondent does fall under said rule, but only 
to the extent of having its performance rendered impos-
sible 'by the other party.' It should be noted that appel-
lants interrupted respondent's performance at just the 
half way point in the proposed 60 day period, claiming 
that respondents could not finish the necessary work 
within the next 30 day period. Appellants alarm was not 
well founded, since appellants with the same supervisor, 
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Harold Ecker, with the smne employees, with no large 
cat until 7 days before the end of the 30 day period, (said 
cat during said 7 days breaking down several times and 
delaying the job), with no traxcavator until after the 
April15 deadline, with appellant Grafe's own admission 
that less hours were put on the job after respondent was 
terminated than prior thereto (R. 208) and finally with 
the uncontroverted evidence that appellants did not get 
into full swing until after April 18, and did not produce 
any ore on their own until July thereafter. N otwithstand-
ing the above factors appellants determined they should 
accept the option on April15. 
There could not as a matter of law have been an actual 
breach until after the 60 day period had elapsed and ap-
pellants had determined that respondent's performance at 
that time was insufficient. Nor could there have been an 
anticipatory breach at the time of termination, since such 
a breach must be by affirmative acts of performer indi-
cating clear intention to renunciate or indicating sub-
stantial performance of his contractual duties impossible, 
or apparently impossible. (Restatement of Contract, Vol. 
1, Section 318 (c) . ) Assuming without basis of fact, that 
respondents did not completely perform: 
"It is not every partial neglect or refusal to 
comply with the terms of the contract by the build-
er which will entitle the owner to rescind, but the 
default must be substantial, and of such a char-
acter as indicates an intention on the part of the 
builder to abandon the contract; there must be an 
actual default, unequivocal renunciation, or legal 
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disability to perform on his part." 17 C.J.S. Con-
tracts 908. 
Appellant's reference on page 10 of his brief to 12 
Am. J ur. 912, is not applicable, since respondent was not 
given the opportunity to perform the full sixty days. 
The cases cited on pages 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of ap-
pellants' brief it is true probably state adequate general 
rules of law, yet said authorities do not assist in the deter-
mination of the rights under appeal in this case, either be-
cause they are not in point factually or on principle of 
law. 
By way of summary therefore of respondent's answer 
to appellant's point No. 1, respondent alleges that the 
evidence shows that respondent pursuant to an agreement 
with appellants, arising out of respondent's proposal, per-
formed the preliminary work of building camp roads and 
buildings, stripping, drilling and removing of ore at the 
Henry mountain claims; that appellant had the option of 
terminating said agreement at any time; that appellants 
did so terminate and are liable to respondent for the ex-
penditures of respondent, incurred in its performance; 
that re~pondent did not breach the agreement since re-
spondent was not given time to finish the work; that ap-
pellants did not have cause to terminate said contract on 
grounds of failure of the performance of respondent, 
since the purpose of exploratory work was easily as-
certainable upon the work of respondent up to the time of 
termination or shortly thereafter with little if any addi-
ional work, and was therefore not an impossibilty as is re-
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quired for recisiOn or a claim of anticipatory breach. 
Therefore Conclusion of Law No. 2 as determined by the 
trial court is not reversible, nor is the findings of fact 
supporting said conclusion reversible. 
APPELLANT'S POINT NO 2 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
NO. 2, to-wit: 
(THAT THE PLAINTIFF) WAS TO BUILD CERTAIN 
ROADS AND TRAILS (ON THE PROPERTY), (THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF) PERFORMED THE PRELIMINARY AND EX-
PLORATORY MINING WORK WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
SAID URANIUM CLAIMS HELD BY THE DEFENDANTS 
IN SAID AREA IN THE HENRY MOUNTAINS, GARFIELD 
COUNTY, UTAH. 
In answer to appellant's Point No. 2, it is well to 
again note, that it is the province of the trial court to de-
termine the facts, their probative value and their suffi--
ciency. It is not the province of the appellate court tore-
try the case, but merely to determine if there is substan-
tial evidence, whether conflicting or not, to support every 
material and controlling finding. Therefore respondent 
in answer to this point respectfully refers to the record 
replete with evidence supporting this Finding of Fact. 
The following testimony by appellant Grafe is sub. 
stantial evidence supporting this Finding of F'act: Per-
tinent portions from the record, (R. 196-198): 
Mr. Mecham 
"Q. Now, you knew when you came to Utah, that 
there was certain preliminary work that 
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would have to be done with reference to this 
operation down there, didn't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you asked the Gibbons and Reed Com-
pany to do this preliminary work for you, 
didn't you~ 
A. Well, I would like to have that made a little 
more clear. 
Q. Did they do any preliminary work with refer-
ence to that operation down there~ 
A. To the mining claims~ 
Q. Yes. 
Q. They did the preliminary work on the labora-
tory tests for you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me rephrase that question for you; see if 
I can make it a little more clear: Now, you 
knew before the actual production of ore took 
place down there that there would have to be 
some preliminary work done in that area; 
perhaps building of bunkhouses and roads, 
maybe, into certain claims, and so forth; you 
knew that type of preliminary work had to be 
done, didn't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just answer the question : Do you know 
whether or not the Gibbons and Reed Com-
pany did that preliminary work for you~ 
A. They did some. 
Q. That's what I wanted; you knew bunkhouses 
had to be built, didn't you, or did you~ 
A. Well, I assume so, yes. 
Q. Would this refresh your memory-this agree-
ment of March 8, indicating the building and 
equipping bunkhouses and equipping 'chow-
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house.' Did you have that understanding with 
Gibbons and Reed' 
~-\.. Yes." 
Please refer to the following additional evidence in 
this regard : 
Appellant Grafe's testimony, (R. 208 and 183); 
Harold Ecker, the supervisor on the job, (R. 242, 
243). 
Appellant's agent Ludwig, (R. 289). 
Appellant Guthrie stated that said contract was an 
oral con tract, ( R. 43). 
:Mr. Jones was sent on a preliminary trip down to 
the claims at the request of appellant Grafe, (R. 54). 
Engineer Robert Deming, who was on the job all of 
the time testified as to the preliminary work, (Dem. dep. 
62). 
It is apparent from the above evidence that the oral 
agreement the subject of this case included the construc-
tion of the necessary roads and campbuildings, and that 
therefore the trial court's finding in this regard is not so 
grossly erroneous as is necessary before the appellate 
court can assume the burden of determining the facts. 
APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 3 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
No. 5, to-wit: 
THAT AS A FURTHER CONDITION OF SAID AGREE-
MENT, THE PLAINTIFF PLACED ON ITS PAYROLL, AT 
THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENDANTS, THE NECESSARY 
WORKMEN TO CONDUCT THE PRELIMINARY AND EX-
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PLORATORY MINING WORK, ALL OF WHICH WAS DONE 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAID AGREEMENT. 
Answer to appellants point No. III is found in appel-
lants answer, paragraph four (R. 5) wherein they admit 
the allegations of respondents complaint, paragraph 
three (R. 1). 
APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 4 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
No.6, to-wit: 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS IN BREACH OF SAID 
AGREEMENT REFUSED TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF FOR 
THE WORK PERFORMED. 
Appellant complains that respondent breached the 
contract first and that appellants could not thereafter 
be guilty of a breach. As pointed out under respondent's 
argument under Point I, appellants cannot claim a breach 
of the agreement by respondent since appellants, 30 
days before completion time, prevented respondent 
from continuing performance. Appellants cannot claim 
an anticipatory breach as shown under Point No. I. 
Appellants cannot claim an abandonment of the per-
formance by respondent since the very elements thereof 
are lacking. 
"To permit an abandonment, it is necessary 
that the failure of performance go to the sub-
stance of the contract, and it would seem that, 
where there is no distinct refusal by the party 
in default to be bound by the contract in the 
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future, his conduct must be such as to show that 
he does not intend to fulfill its obligations. How-
ever, the default need not be such as to defeat 
the whole purpose of the contract." 17 C.J.S. 
980. 
"Strictly an "anticipatory breach" of a con-
tract is one committed before the time has come 
when there is a present duty of perforn1ance, 
and it is the outcome of words or acts evincing 
an intention to refuse performance in the future." 
17 C.J.S. 973. 
See also Sinclair Refining Co. v. Costin, 116 S.W. 
2d 894. 
Prior to the end of the 60 day period, i.e., April 15, 
there could have been no breach of the contract. "A 
contract may be conditioned to be executed or a debt 
may be made payable at a future time, and here the 
specified time must elapse before the performance of 
the contract or the debt becomes absolutely due." 17 
C.J.S. 938. 
It is uniformly held that where performance is to 
be done by a certain time, the performance need not be 
apportioned equally over the whole period, just so the 
performance is complete on the last day, hour or minute, 
set as the time limit. See Hale v. Trout, 35 Cal. 229 and 
Lone Star Salt Co. v. Texas Short Line R. Co., 90 S.W. 
863, 3 L.R.A.N.S. 828, and Oriental Trading Co. v. 
Houser, 151 P. 242, 87 Wash. 184. 
In view of the above argument and authorities, it 
is readily apparent that respondent committed neither 
a breach nor anticipatory breach at any time. Time for 
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payment in a contract where the time is not specifically 
de signa ted is legally inferred to be at the completion 
of the work. Lavan v. Cowan, 291 P. 877, Gustafson v. 
Cullen, 283 P. 1087. Therefore, since payment has not 
been received (R. 67) appellants are in breach of their 
implied agreement to pay for the services rendered by 
Gibbons & Reed. 
Appellants on page 20 of their brief make reference 
to negligent and wilful conduct. In as much as there 
is nothing in this case eoncerning either negligence or 
wilful breach, said reference is not in point. 
Appellant makes reference on page 21 to approval 
of performance. Respondent does not question the right 
of appellant to terminate the contract. The contract 
was so entered into with that understanding. The agree-
ment was entered into with the express option that 
appellants could at any time stop performance by Gib-
bons & Reed. Appellants, however, cannot terminate 
said contract and then unjustifiably claim that Gibbons 
& Reed breached the contract, and thus should not be 
paid for their expenses. 
Therefore, appellants argument on page 21 does 
not have any particular application to the instant prob-
lem. 
In summary therefore it may be stated that the lower 
court was clearly justified in law and fact in entering 
its findings of Fact No.6. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
~\PPELL~-\.NT'S POINT NO. 5 
THE SlTFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
No.6, to-wit: 
"THAT THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE COMMENCEMENT 
OF PERFORMANCE OF SAID AGREEMENT TO THE 
TERMINATION THEREOF HAD PERFORMED BONA 
FIDEDLY AND IN REASONABLE AND COMPLETE CON-
FORMANCE WITH THE TERMS OF SAID AGREEMENT." 
For the most part the answer to appellants point 
No. 5 is found in respondents answer to appellants point 
No. 1. However, brief comment should be made upon 
counsel for appellants statement: "Here we have a highly 
specialized proposal to perform three distinct and clear-
cut operations, to-wit:" * * * This statement does not 
conform to appellants testimony and answers to inter-
rogatories set forth in the record. 
Appellant Guthrie stated that the contract was an 
oral agreement (R. 43) and it was not a unit price or 
lump sum contract. Further, appellants in their answers 
to plaintiff's interrogatories, claimed said proposal was 
an estimate, question 19: 
"Q. Was there any item listed in your Exhibit 
A to which defendants did not agree~ (R. 21). 
A. Defendants did not agree on any item in the 
proposal but merely relied upon the proposal 
as an estimate of ultimate costs." Exhibit 
13. 
The wording of the written proposal itself, shows 
that the number of holes, etc., is an estimated perform-
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ance (Exhibit A). Notwithstanding the above facts, 
appellant now attempts to make this Exhibit A the only 
part of the contract, and in direct contradiction to its 
terms attempts to make this a contract for a certain 
sum of money for the drilling of a certain number of 
holes. Appellants' position in regard to the contract 
appears to vacillate at will and in accordance with the 
desired result of the minute. 
Proposal Exhibit A, as has been heretofore shown 
by the evidence, was a cost basis upon which the costs 
of the operation could be predicated. Respondent com-
menced such operation, incurred costs such as rental 
rates and labor and material costs before being termin·· 
ated by appellants, and now makes demand upon appel-
lants for its costs incurred in accordance with the agree-
ment and the rates included therein. 
There is no question but that all parties concerned 
knew of the purpose of the agreement between appellant 
and respondents; that purpose being the determination 
of the advisability of exercising an option concerning 
said claims on the 15th day of April. As heretofore 
pointed out under the answer to point No. 1 and point 
No. 4, appellants determined the advisability of exercis-
ing the option, almost entirely upon the results of the 
work done by Gibbons & Reed. There is substantial 
evidence supporting this Finding of F·act and under the 
law heretofore cited under respondent's answer to points 
1 and 4, appellants position under this point is not ten-
able. 
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APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 6 
"THE ALLEGED ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT 
ENTERING A FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION AND 
JUDGMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT RESPONDENT FAIL-
ED, NEGLECTED AND REFUSED TO PERFORM UNDER 
PROPOSAL (EXHIBIT A) AND THAT RESPONDENTS 
CONDUCT OF ITS OPERATIONS WAS SO INEFFICIENT 
AND INEFFECTIVE BY REASON OF WORN AND BROKEN 
EQUIPMENT AND POOR MANAGEMENT THAT APPEL-
LANTS WERE OBLIGED TO TERMINATE." 
In answer to appellants point No. 6, respondent 
contends that this alleged finding which appellants desire 
the Supreme Court to insert is not within the province 
of an appellate court but rather is a matter for the trial 
court. Further, this alleged finding is obviously in direct. 
contradiction to those Findings of Fact which the lower 
court did find in the trial of this case to be substantially 
supported by sufficient evidence and which findings re-
spondent has discussed previously in this brief. There-
fore the requested Finding under this point No. 6 is 
without basis unless all of the Findings of the lower 
court are reversed. 
However, brief answer, at the risk of repetition, 
shall be made concerning appellants reference to worn 
and broken equipment and poor management. It is 
believed that ample answer has heretofore been made 
to that portion of appellants' point referring to failure, 
neglect and refusal to perform. 
Appellant has attempted to use for an excuse for 
terminating the contract and taking it over themselves, 
the fact that on March 12, when appellant visited the 
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job, the D-8 cat and the air compressor were broken. 
Appellants predicate their position on the false assump-
tion that equipment should not break down at all on such 
an operation as this. Respondent, however, contends that 
on all jobs there is the probability that the equipment 
shall need repairs. This is borne out by the fact that even 
the new equipment which appellants brought onto the 
job broke down several times in the short week it was on 
the job prior to April 15 (Dem. dep. 63). When the cat 
and compressor broke down on March 12, Mr. Boyer, 
the heavy duty equipment mechanic asked for permission 
to procure the parts (R. 102), knowing that it would only 
take a short time with the parts and to repair the cat 
(R. 115, 116). Appellants refused to send for the parts 
(R. 114), or to request Gibbons & Reed to make the repair. 
The air compressor only required fifteen minutes to 
repair (R. 286). The usual parts were on hand for such 
a construction job, according to the testimony of said 
mechanic and according to Mr. Deming. (R.101, 115, 116) 
(Dem. dep. 37). 
Apparently Mr. Ecker, who as is evident, was not 
familiar with a D-8 cat nor who was not a mechanic 
(R. 249, 250), Mr. Guthrie, who admittedly was a refrig-
eration engineer (R. 273) and apparently was not fa-
miliar with the cat (R. 275), and had not been on the 
job before (R. 274), and Mr. Grafe, who did not know 
the necessary parts (R. 175), all were on the job March 
12 and seeing the cat broken down, ordered the job 
stopped, not knowing the extent of the repairs needed 
and not being concerned therewith. Both Mr. Boyer 
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and :Jlr. Den1ing· testified that the operations with Gib-
bons & Reed equip1nent were normal for such a job. 
(R. 98, 115) (Dem. dep. 62). 
The D-S cat had been inspected at the Salt Lake 
shops of Gibbons & Reed, having just come from a job 
where it was being used in Washington. (R. 104). 
From the above evidence the lower court correctly 
found that the respondent supplied proper equipment for 
the job and in so doing performed the contract bona 
fidedly until stopped by appellants. 
A.ppellants contention of poor management is entire-
ly inconsistent with the facts in the case and in par-
ticularly \\ith the testimony of appellants themselves, 
and therefore said contention is without any basis what-
soever, either factual or inferential. 
Appellant Grafe himself testified that appellants had 
no complaint with the personnel (R. 188) and in fact 
retained all personnel, including the Eckers, Deming 
and laborers on the job. (R. 244, 158, 184), (Dem. dep. 
37). The supervision of the job was in the hands of Mr. 
Ecker, to whom appellants had no objection. After the 
termination of March 12, the very same employees and 
supervision stayed on the job doing the same work, but 
using some different pieces of equipment when said 
equipment ultimately arrived. 
Therefore, it cannot be the prerogative of the appel-
lants to now complain of the management, even if they 
had cause therefor. Such a claim is as superficial as 
appellants alleged grounds for terminating the contract. 
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The cases cited by appellant under this point all 
appear to go the point that parties must show perform-
ance in order to recover on the contract. The answer to 
all such cases is found in the Findings of Fact, deter-
mined by the lower court, to the effect that respondent 
did perform. Unless such findings are entirely unsup-
ported by evidence in the lower court the findings will 
stand. Such evidence has been pointed out in respond-
ent's previous answers in this brief. 
APPELLANT'S. POINT NO. 7 AND 8 
"THE ALLEGED ERROR IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 
"B" AND "C", THE OPERATING LEDGER AND PAYROLL 
JOURNAL OF RESPONDENT." 
Again, under this point, appellant is under a mis-
apprehension as to the nature of the agreement entered 
into. Appellants apparently contend that the agreement 
was a unit price or lump sum contract for the perform-
ance of three distinct operations and no more. As here-
tofore pointed out under respondent's answer to previous 
points, the proposal was for a continuing performance 
at a certain proposed cost, the basis of which cost was 
set forth in the written proposal, but that the contract 
was an oral agreement encompassing other elements than 
the mere cost basis of the proposal (Exhibit A). 
Respondent did not make this proposal upon the 
unit cost which appellant seems to argue, i.e., the work 
was not undertaken at so many dollars per hole drilled, 
at so many dollars per tons acquired from drifting, etc. 
The proposal does not so state. The terms of the cost 
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basis are stated on the proposal and it is clearly evirlent 
that it is a cost basis for the use and rental of equipment 
and carrying the payroll of the workmen. 
~-\ppellants in point No. 7 contend that respond-
ents have not proven their damages, i.e., the expendi-
tures incurred on this job. Appellants by their argument 
would seem to require that one person be on the job, 
check on the perforn1ance, prepare the time cards, pay 
the 1nen, receive the invoices, pay for the materials, 
then prepare and keep the daily ledger sheets for the 
corporation itself. Such a position is not logical nor in 
any respects reasonable, nor does such a position con-
form to the accepted practice in our modern society or 
to the law governing the same. 
Respondent proved the performance of the contract. 
See the statement of facts and references to record at 
the beginning of this brief. The trial court so determined 
in its Findings of Fact. As shown by Mr. Deming, who 
was hired and stayed on the job to keep account of the 
expenses, the expenses from the field for said perform-
ance, were currently and daily sent into the office of 
Gibbons & Reed, (Dem. dep. 66-69) as were the costs 
incurred by Mr. Ecker for materials (R. 246). Thereafter 
Mr. Ed. Shea, Assistant Secretary Treasurer of Gibbons 
& Reed, testified concerning the original ledger sheet and 
the original payroll, that said documents were prepared 
currently with the receipt of the invoice or statement of 
account. (R. 107-112). Thus documentary evidence was 
admitted in evidence by the Court in the form of the 
original Ledger sheets showing the payment of all ac-
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counts payable to said project (Exhibit B), and the 
original company payrolls covering salaries of the work-
men on the project (Exhibit C). Appellants subjected 
the witness to cross examination on both documents, 
raising three questions with reference to the general 
ledger sheets, concerning (a) The item of $50.00 paid 
for serving an attachment, which item respondent agreed 
to strike from the costs, (b) Rental of certain equipment 
from the Folger Equipment, and (c) Two items of sal-
aries and expense of George Jones and Pat Gibbons. 
These items were identified by Mr. Jones. (R. 142, 143). 
It is conclusively shown by the above evidence, con-
trary to appellants' contention, that respondent proved 
performance of the contract, proved the expenditures 
incurred and the transmittal of same to the office and 
proved the daily tabulation of said costs to determine 
the total expenditure for the job. 
Having established the factual support for the dam-
ages incurred, respondent respectfully submits the fol-
lowing authorities, supporting the admissibility of the 
records as submitted by respondent for the proof of the 
expenditures incurred : 
LEDGER SHEETS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVI-
DENCE AS ORIGINAL ENTRIES OF BOOK AC-
COUNT'S UNDER SHOP-BOOK RULE. On Page 1072, 
Paragraph 567 a of Jones on Evidence, Civil Cases. 
Fourth Edition, it is quoted as follows: 
"* * * This rule has been extended so as to 
admit proof of such books and entries after a 
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showing of authenticity, where the person who 
Inade the entry although still alive appears not 
to be aYailable as a witness. And books are held 
to be admissible where the entries have been made 
in the regular course of business by the shop-
keeper hiinself. Accordingly, it has become the 
established rule that books or entries therein 
zchich ha &·e been kept or made by the shopkeeper 
himself or by his clerk or agent in the regular 
course of business are admissible to prove the 
sale, delivery, or price of goods, performance of 
work, labor or services, or in some instances even 
other matters than accounts which are shown by 
such entries. 
"While in some of the States the old Shop-
Book Rule has been enlarged and extended with-
out the enactment of any statute, Legislatures 
have very generally enacted laws under which 
business records and contemporaneous entries 
therein are admissible. Many of the statutes not 
being limited to books of account and entries 
therefrom extended to records and entries gen-
erally which are made in the regular course of 
business. In view of the fact that the purpose of 
such legislation is to afford a more workable rule 
of evidence in the proof of business transactions 
under existing business conditions, it has been 
held that the statute should be construed lib-
erally * * * ." 
On Page 1077 of Jones on Evidence: 
"Account books are properly used for the 
purpose of showing contemporaneous charges for 
goods or materials furnished or services rendered 
in the course of dealing between the parties, and 
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also to serve as evidence of such facts, and of 
the promise implied by law to pay therefor* * *." 
On Page 1078 of Jones on Evidence: 
"Although books are admittedly more satis-
factory where it appears that they have been 
kept in the form of daily entries or debits and 
credits in a day book or journal, this is not 
essential; they may have been kept in the form 
of a ledger, if this is the general mode, in which 
the party keeps his books-provided that the 
entries are original entries. The book may take 
the form of a timebook evidencing, not only the 
labor of the Plaintiff, but that of his apprentice 
or assistant as well. 
"But the book should be a regular and usual 
account book such as explains itself and appears 
on its face to create a liability by reason of an 
account with the party against whom it is offered 
and not a mere memorandum for some other 
purpose * * •." 
On Page 1079 of Jones on Evidence: 
"* * * While mere loose sheets of paper have 
been held not to be admissible, a different case is 
presented where it appears that the disputed 
account was kept in accordance with modern busi-
ness practices, including the use of loose-leaf 
business books as books of original entry * * * ." 
On Page 1082 of Jones on Evidence: 
"* * * Much must be left to the discretion of 
the judge who presides at the trial because hav-
ing the books before him and understanding all 
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the circumstances of the case, he is best able to 
decide upon all questions involving the fairness 
and regularity of the entries sought to be proved 
* • * " 
At the bottmn of Page 1082 of Jones on Evidence: 
"Entries in books are not ordinarily adinis-
sible in evidence unless they appear to have been 
made in the regular course of business or as an 
incident of the party's system of keeping his 
accounts "' "' "'." 
On Page 1089 of Jones on Evidence: 
"* * * The books must be produced in Court 
so as to be available for inspection by the adverse 
party, and in order that their credibility may be 
tested by their appearance or by the cross-exam-
ination of the party." 
The case of Corkan vs. Rutter, 69 Atlantic 954 was 
an action for work and material upon repairs performed 
for the defendant, it appeared that the workmen were 
required to enter upon blank forms the amount of work 
and material consumed during specific periods of time, 
such slips constituting the basis for day book entries. 
It was held that the books of account made upon the 
basis of such slips were admissible in evidence without 
extraneous evidence to support them. 
The reasoning of the Court in arriving at this con-
clusion is expressed in the following summary of the rule 
applicable to such situations: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
"We think it clear that if no slips at all had 
been used, these books would be entirely com-
petent upon a system of workmen reporting orally 
to the bookkeeper the number of hours consumed 
and materials used. Business could not go on 
unless the employer could rely on the statements 
of employees in such matters; and every book 
account in a business of any magnitude is neces-
sarily made up in large measure of entries based 
on reports of employees. The system of making 
such reports in writing has the manifest advan-
tages, among many of keeping check on the work-
men, avoiding disputes between them and the 
employer by making a permanent record of the 
work and facilitating the work of the office clerks, 
but we fail to see that the adoption of such a 
system requires the production and offer of slips 
as imparting any competency to the books or 
limiting their availability as evidence * * * ." 
"The fact that a party's books of account 
are kept in loose-leaf form or on card index files, 
will not necessarily operate to exclude same from 
use at the trial; provided it appears that the 
books contain original entries and are contem-
poraneous with the transaction to which they 
relate. Douglas vs. Parker, 235 Pacific 148; Polus 
vs. Conner, 176 N.E. 234; New York Motor Car 
Company vs. Greenfield, 145 New York Supp. 33." 
In Wylie vs. Bushnell, 115 N.E. 618, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois stated: 
"No special form * * * of keeping books is 
required. The question of their competency and 
sufficiency must be determined by the appearance 
and character of the account, regard being had 
to the character of the work and the qualifications 
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ordinarily required in keeping books of account 
as to such business. Separate scraps of paper 
have been admitted in evidence as books when 
sworn to as such. A notched stick has been held 
to be admissible as a book of original entries 
where the accuracies of the entries was satis-
factorily tested by comparison with an account 
with notched sticks some time previous. Sheets 
from a looseleaf ledger system accounts, contain-
ing the original entries are when properly iden-
tified, admissible in evidence. The ma.terial, form, 
or construction of the book o If ered in evidence 
as a book of original entries, is unimportant. The 
manner of keeping accounts is the important con-
sideration. If they are in such form and so pre-
served as to fairly show the true statement of the 
accounts between the parties, and can, under the 
rules governing the making of such en tries, be 
fairly held to be original entries, that is all that 
is required. To hold that they must be in a bound 
book form, all in cases is giving more importance 
to form than to substance. The vital question in 
such cases is whether the entries offered are 
original charges, are true, and have been made 
at or about the time of transaction." 
Similarly, it was held in Lewis vs. England, 14 
Wyoming 128, 82 Pacific 869, that: 
uThe law prescribes no regular mode or 
method in which accounts must be kept in order 
to make them competent as evidence. The ques-
tion of competency must be determined by the 
appeara.nce and character of the book, regard 
being had to the degree of education of the party,_ 
the nature of his business, the manner of his 
charges against other people, and all other sur-
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rounding circumstances. The material, form, 
construction of the book offered in evidence as 
the book of original entry are unimportant, pro-
vided such book be capable of perpetuating a 
record of events, and the entries are made in 
conformity with the general rules governing the 
admissibility of such entries." 
The prevailing view is to admit looseleaf records 
when properly identified and authenticated and when 
shown to be a part of a ledger which conforms to the 
broad rules of books of accounts kept in the regular 
course of business. Wyle vs. Bushnell, 115 N.E. 618. In 
the case of Crump vs. Bank of Toccoa, 153 S.E. 531, the 
court pointed out in discussing the admissibility of ledger 
sheets: 
"What was introduced was not really a book 
in the ordinary sense, but consisted of detach-
able sheets taken from a looseleaf ledger, and 
contained a record of the account between the 
parties. These documents, however, will be treat-
ed as a book and for the convenience herein will 
be called a book since such leaves or sheets may 
be removed from the ledger containing them and 
introduced in evidence upon the same footing and 
under the same principles as are applicable to 
the introduction of books of account, where the 
proper foundation of such evidence is otherwise 
laid. It is immaterial whether the original entrie~ 
of the account be made in a book or on separate 
sheets of paper, the requirement to this matter 
being that the documents shall comprise an ac-
count of the dealings between the parties and 
shall be primary and original." 
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In the case of Grahm vs. Work, reported at 141 N.W. 
4:2S, the Supren1e Court of Iowa, held as follows: 
"The rnanner of keeping the accounts is the 
important consideration. If they are in such forrn 
and so preserved as to identify as to carry to the 
mind the conclusion that the true state of accounts 
between the parties is therein shown from the 
original entries, to hold that they must be in 
bound book form is giving importance to form 
rather than to substance. The vital question in 
such cases is whether the entries offered are the 
original charges, are true, and proven to have 
been made at or near the time of transaction." 
The evidence clearly discloses : 
(1) The books of account admitted rn evidence 
were honestly kept. 
(2) The ledger sheets and the payroll sheets are 
books of original entry. 
(3) The entries on the payroll sheets were made 
in the regular course of business or employment. 
(4) The entries on the payroll sheets and ledger 
sheets were made contemporaneously with the transac-
tions. 
( 5) The entrant and the person supervising the 
entries was called as a witness and testified as to the 
original entries and the time which the entries were made. 
(6) The entrant testified that the books were cor-
rectly kept. 
With further reference to Appellant's contention 
that Respondent was to perform on actual cost basis and 
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that the ledger sheets might have included items of profit, 
we respectfully submit that the testimony and evidence 
in the record shows that the parties entered into the 
instant agreement and that included therein were certain 
figures on the cost which Gibbons & Reed Company 
would incur in doing the work. The testimony shows 
that no profit was included therein, since profits were 
anticipated from future work to be performed subsequent 
to this contract. Appellants agreed to these rates from 
the very inception of the contract and the evidence so 
shows. The Appellants, did not at any time object to 
these rates or notify Gibbons & Reed that the rates were 
not satisfactory. The charges for this work were based 
upon the agreed rates, and the record adequately shows 
the ledger sheets to he evidence of the agreed costs of 
this job. 
In conclusion therefore, respondent believes that 
Appellants contention as to the admissibility of the 
ledger sheets and the payroll and as to the probative 
value of same is founded upon a misinterpretation of 
the facts as shown in the record. Respondent maintains 
that the facts and authorities cited show more than an 
adequate foundation for the admissibility of the ledger 
sheets and payrolls. Respondent further believes that the 
probative value of said documents cannot be seriously 
questioned, inasmuch as they are evidence of the amount 
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of costs, at the rate agreed upon by appellants and re-
spondents, which respondent incurred in the performance 
of the exploratory work for appellants and were all sub-
jected to inspection and cross-examination. 
APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 9 
"THE SUFFICIENCY OF CONCLUSION OF LAW No. 3, 
TO-WIT: THAT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
ANY RELIEF ON THEIR COUNTER-CLAIM AND THAT 
THE SAME SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE." 
In answer to appellants point No. 9, it is sufficient 
to state that the lower court properly ruled that appel-
lants were not entitled to recover on their counterclaim. 
Appellants submitted no evidence upon which recovery 
could be granted and failed to offer any evidence of 
damage, and failed in all other particulars to sustain 
their burden of proof. Appellants' failure to show dam-
ages obviously results from the fact that appellants suf-
fered no damage. Appellants exercised their option, with 
very little, if any, work required after respondent was 
ordered off the job. Appellants received the benefit of 
said option, of the ore produced by respondents, of thP 
roads constructed and of the camp buildings built. As a 
matter of fact appellants received only benefits from this 
agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants and respondent entered into an oral sixty 
day agreement based upon certain cost rates, the purpose 
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of which was to permit appellants to determine if they 
should enter into an operating agreement on said proper-
ties with a Mr. Weeks. Appellants in accordance with 
their right to terminate the agreement, did so, at the half 
way point. Appellants could not have terminated on the 
grounds of respondent's breach, since respondent still 
had half of the time left in which to perform. Appellants 
could not have terminated upon the theory of anticipatory 
breach, since from the facts it is evident that respond-
ent's performance was nearly complete and could have 
been completed shortly thereafter and within the time 
limit of the sixty day option. The only theory upon 
which appellants could terminate was merely upon their 
right to do so as set forth in the proposal, Exhibit "A." 
Upon such a termination the law is uniform that respond-
ents are entitled to their costs expended to that point of 
termination. Respondent performed in a bona fide man-
ner the work agreed upon and did so in accordance with 
the proposed rates and procedures. The benefits of re-
spondent's efforts have been accepted and retained by 
appellants. Respondent's, by the very terms of the agree-
ment, ate not seeking profits but merely demand to be 
made whole, for work and service rendered. 
Appellants in this appeal have raised no issues of 
law, but have predicated their appeal entirely upon an 
alleged failure of the facts in the case. It is belie-red 
that upon the showing of substantial evidence supporting 
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the lower court's findings that appellants' appeal is ren-
dered nugatory. Respondent has pointed out the evidence 
upon which the lower court based its judgrnent and 
appellant has entirely failed to show any lack of such 
evidence. Therefore respondent respectfully submits that 
the judgment of the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE AND MECHAM, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ALLAN E. MECHAM 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
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